Future Students, Alumni & Visitors





Archive for the ‘Board and Committee Leadership’ Category

First Among Equals: The Art of Chairing a Board

The former Prime Minister whispered in my ear before the board meeting of the bank, “Watch the way I chair this meeting, Richard.” Seeing a meeting chaired almost perfectly is a rarity so I paid attention and was not disappointed. Contrast this to another bank board meeting, where the CEO pounded the table, berating the chair in front of directors, and the chair said very little during the meeting. Both chairs are non-executive, supposedly independent, yet these meetings played out very differently.

I have observed, interviewed and assessed chairs operating in many industries, both inside and outside of Canada, including agriculture, airline, automobile, banking, credit union, crown, forestry, health care, insurance, mining, oil and gas, not-for-profit, pharmaceutical, steel and technology sectors.

Don’t assume all chairs are equal or a chair is effective given an external profile. Chair performance varies widely. Ask directors.

What separates the good from bad chairs?

How do you really know if a chair is effective, from outside the boardroom? Here are some tips.

Independence: Is the chair really independent? Watch for the CEO trying to capture the chair through perks, office support, vacations, jobs for family members, donations to charities, social relations – anything below the radar screen and hard to detect. In the words of one director during an assessment, “The Chair is owned by the CEO.” He was right. Chairs are very candid with me on how influence happens.

Chair Criteria: Integrity, agendas, coaching and development, commitment, information flow, financial literacy, fit with the CEO (including chemistry but also being tough-minded, rigorous and disciplined), holding people accountable, chairing of meetings, consensus-building, and building of healthy dynamics are all attributes and skills of successful chairs.

Chair Performance: I have observed and have data confirming chairs or lead directors that are ineffective and beholden to management or a significant shareholder despite what external disclosures are. Be skeptical.

Chair Selection: The chair should be selected from and by independent directors. Each director should offer confidential views and a formal vote should be taken. A committee should have chair succession planning in its mandate. All directors who participate in chair recommendation to the board should be uninterested in the role. The CEO should have no influence whatsoever, although he or she should be appropriately consulted given the importance of Chair-CEO fit.

Chair Tenure: Have a three-year appointment, with the option of one further term only if there is clear consensus no one else is better.

Chair Compensation: Watch for the quantum of total compensation, as it gives rise to reasonable perception of independence. A board chair is a part-time position and should be paid as such. I remember when a CEO said to me in the board meeting that he needed to get paid a lot so he wouldn’t “get nervous” and the lead director – also paid a lot – chuckled and agreed.

Chair Evaluation: Chairs should be assessed by each director and reporting management annually. Debriefing should occur between the board chair and the governance/nominating committee chair. Each director should be able to make use of this person/position if he or she has any performance-related concerns with the Chair.

Focusing the Board on Value: Last, but not least, the most important role of the Chair is to ensure the maximization of company performance and shareholder value. Research in Motion and other companies take note. When there is a value deficit, independent Chairs must have the courage to act. The Chair must have value creation skills, experience, leadership and a proper mindset that is focused like a laser on this end and the board’s responsibility to maximize performance and value. Absent the right individual in the role, other qualifications are moot. Substance over form should prevail.

The above points apply equally to Lead Directors in the American context, but because Lead Directors don’t chair full board meetings, it is critical that the attributes and selection of the person – particularly independence, influence and impact – be carefully thought through.

Next to the selection of CEO, the selection of board chair is probably the most important decision a board makes. If a board is ineffective, it is likely the chair is also ineffective and should be replaced. The chair has the single greatest impact on board effectiveness.

Why Corporate Boards Lack Courage

Last night on the national news, embattled imaging-seller Kodak was compared to Research in Motion by a commentator comparing both companies’ inability to exploit advantages that they originally created. Regarding Kodak, one younger woman who was interviewed remarked, “What is film?”

A few weeks ago, I took a friend into a Black’s Photography store to have a digital picture taken for a LinkedIn profile picture. I asked the employee if he could take several digital pictures and email them to us so we could select one. The person had not even heard of social media, let alone LinkedIn, and said that the store could only take passport photos in hard copy form. Then we drove up the street to another picture store. This time we were told that there is a $300 “sitting fee” to have a picture taken. I took my friend’s picture myself with my digital camera and we downloaded the picture into LinkedIn in less than 15 minutes. I replaced my blackberry phone with an iPhone about three years ago. I doubt these photography stores – and maybe even RIM – will exist in their present form in the next few years.

Kodak is on the brink of bankruptcy. Three of its directors resigned this week. In a Harvard Business Review blog, an adjunct professor Simon Wong wrote a post questioning whether independent directors should flee their companies in times of trouble. Wong argued that it’s problematic for such directors to leave when they are “most needed.” Professor Michael Useem from Wharton maintained that leadership means you “stay the course.”

I would argue the opposite. The very people who caused the problem are unlikely the ones to solve it. These directors are probably “least needed.”

The question is not whether failed directors should stay on boards, but why they were not replaced sooner. Directors should be much easier to hire and fire by shareholders. Today, it’s virtually impossible to do either easily. These two things need to change for corporate governance to improve.

Kodak’s business model should have changed two years ago and maybe if shareholders could replace the directors more easily who were incapable of changing the management and business model, this actually would have been better.

Shareholders should not have to fight long, expensive public relations or proxy battles or arm-twist behind closed doors to effect change because they have no legal channel to do otherwise. Right now in Canada, shareholders cannot even vote “against” a director (they must either vote “for” or “withhold”), and a director can be elected to a board with a single vote “for” under existing legislation. This also needs to change to give power to shareholders to nominate and replace board members of the companies they own.

Currently, troubled boards drag their feet, are silent, write letters, conduct studies, avoid meetings, and refrain from making the tough changes necessary. They do so simply because they can. We see examples of this almost on a weekly basis. Why is this so? Self-interest and lack of courage.

The self-interest is obvious. Directors are conflicted as they are assessing their own performance and would rather not advocate their own replacement. Change will unlikely come from within.

Regarding lack of courage, experienced non-executive chair and activist investor, Henry D. Wolfe, a member of the LinkedIn Group, Boards and Advisors, when speaking of directorial courage from an investor’s perspective, wrote yesterday:

“From an investor’s perspective, if I am aware that directors in a company in which I have a position are acting cowardly because they fear the ramifications, then I would be inclined to take action to replace those directors with individuals who will not shirk from taking the action necessary, including speaking their mind, to aggressively pursue the maximization of the funds that I have invested.”

Why do boards lack courage, or the willingness to act during non-performance and significant declines in shareholder value? Three reasons: they are not truly independent (I have written about director independence earlier); they lack the recent and relevant industry experience to know what to do; and they lack leadership. They therefore become captured by management, defaulting to process and denial rather than making tough choices in the interests of shareholders.

Corporate governance is a rather genteel sport at present. Many directors of companies have not led or significantly influenced the very industries as executives on whose corporate boards they sit. Be it technology, transportation, mining or financial services, if you scrutinize failed or underperforming boards or companies – really scrutinize – this serious shortcoming – the lack of industry experience and leadership – will become obvious. Many more directors need to have been the primary person responsible for driving superior performance and redefining competitive dynamics within the industry for corporate boards to be effective. These directors should be sourced globally. Local accountants, lawyers, business school deans, consultants, politicians, and even CEOs of unrelated industries are nice but they should be the minority. A majority of these latter individuals is not the recipe for an effective board. Sadly, many corporate boards look like this, are dated, and are in dire need of renewal and diversification.

Lastly, and most importantly, boards need to be independently led, in substance and form. First and foremost, the nonexecutive chair should have a deep and full understanding of value creation for shareholders and a mindset for the longer term; be disciplined and focused on strategy development and execution; and be able to lead and inspire – really lead – independent directors and maximize their engagement, performance and focus on the most critical objectives. Any board that is ineffective likely has an ineffective chair.

Then, and only then – when a board is independent, composed of industry leaders, and effectively led – will it rise up and have the will to act. The fact this has not happened yet in many troubled companies means change must occur by shareholders rather than from within. Regulators would be well served to enable corporate governance changes to be facilitated by investors.

Executive Compensation is “Corrosive” and “Undermines Trust”: Connecting the Occupy Movements

I remember when US pay czar Ken Feinberg told a group of academics gathered at Wharton business school for a corporate governance conference to discuss the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis that he was looking for independent compensation consultants and, to quote Mr. Feinberg, “there are no independent compensation consultants.” So he turned to academics. He wanted to study the claim by consultants that executives need to be paid extraordinarily high compensation or else they would migrate to other companies and jurisdictions, which – as it turned out – did not happen, Feinberg said, or is a “myth” as was stated in the UK this week. Addressing conflicts of interest by compensation consultants is only one of twelve reforms being urged by the “Final report of the High Pay Commission” in a scathing report released this week in the UK.

Reforms to the way executive compensation is set in the UK are forthcoming that may include significant and unprecedented changes – well beyond the structural Dodd-Frank reforms in the US. Changes that may be termed “radical” by some include: binding and forward-looking voting on compensation by all shareholders; having women and worker representation on compensation committees of boards; regulating remuneration consultants; regulating the disclosure, unnecessarily complexity and format of “fair pay” compensation; and having board of director positions advertised and applied for publicly.

A central theme throughout the compensation debate has been that boards and compensation committees – particularly in the US and UK but also elsewhere – have been incapable or unwilling to address the uncontrolled disparity between pay of CEOs compared to that of other senior management and, in particular, the pay of average workers, even throughout the financial crisis. The market is not really “free,” proponents maintain, but is in reality a “closed shop” (words of the Chairwoman Hargreaves of the High Pay Commission) (video). That is to say that pay is set by a small, heterogeneous, interlocked and self-selected group of management and directors. University of Delaware professor Charles Elson and his graduate student, Craig Ferrere, have documented an annual, compounded structural 17% increase in CEO pay over decades as a result of the way CEOs are paid at or above median and the marketing of peer group data by consultants. In some cases, exit pay packages for CEOs have been the hundreds of millions of dollars. The public outrage seemingly falls on some or many (but by no means all) tone-deaf boards and senior management teams.

All reforms are now on the table and the UK Prime Minister and Business Secretary Vince Cable have weighed in, including Mr. Cable expressing sympathy with the “Occupy” movement and calling the current system “dysfunctional” and a failure of corporate governance.

What the Occupy movements have done, it can be argued, is focus the discourse on the consequences of wealth disparity. Ted Talk by British researcher Richard Wilkinson, for example, talks about the harm to society that results from economic inequality, notably the gaps within (not between) societies, which include harms such as life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, crime, teenage births, obesity and mental illness. (Credit goes to former York University student, Cliff Davidson, for showing me this link.) The link between wealth disparity and social harm is an “extraordinarily close correlation,” Professor Wilkinson states.

What the UK experience also shows is that regulators are prepared to step in and bridge gaps if industry proves incapable or unable to do so itself. In a speech I gave a year ago, I recommended that North American compensation consultants devise a code of conduct for consultants – independently developed and enforced – that includes consequences for breach, similar to regimes that lawyers and accountants have, or governments eventually would do so for them. John Tory was in the audience and endorsed my notion of industry leadership before government regulation. Regulation tends to have unintended consequences, and industry leadership is far superior to the former. Industry leadership unfortunately is not happening and is unlikely given vested interests. We have seen the consequences of inaction in the UK.

Boards and Sexual Assault on Campus

“As the graduate assistant put the sneakers in the locker, he looked into the shower. He saw a naked boy, Victim 2, whose age he estimated to be ten years old, with his hands up against the wall, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked Sandusky. … The graduate assistant left immediately, distraught.”

I apologize to all readers for quoting this alleged abhorrently heinous criminal conduct from the Grand Jury report to what is reputed to be several young boys.

Universities are historic institutions, steeped in tradition. Many however have sorely outdated governance practices. Penn State is a good example. What can we learn?

Penn State prides itself on not changing the size or composition of its board since 1951. What this means is that the entire organization is not keeping up with the times.

Thirty-two directors is not a board: it is a theatre. A board this large means management dominates and decisions are made in advance rather than at the table.

The board of trustees should immediately disestablish the Executive Committee chaired by the President. An executive committee means a “real” board where management controls rather than the board and its committees.

The board size should be reduced to half: sixteen directors maximum and preferably fewer. Multi national corporations have fewer directors.

The university president, or any other member of management, should have no influence whatsoever into director selection.

Penn State does not even have an audit or risk committee. What good board does not have an audit committee? The audit/risk committee should oversee conduct and compliance reporting. Where is this obligation overseen by a committee of the Penn State board, I wonder? No committee charters are available, which is another red flag.

A nominating and governance committee should also be established. So should a human resource committee. It is remarkable that audit, nominating or HR committees do not exist and this again suggests undue influence by management who does not want this oversight.

Penn State’s governance statements are verbose, pompous, self serving and ineffective, as are those of many colleges and universities, deliberately so and written by management who write for a living. Key governance documents are missing, such as the competencies and skills of each director linked to their responsibilities; the code of conduct; compliance procedures for the code; whistle-blowing provisions; a position description for the president; and position descriptions for the board and committee chairs.

These are now requirements for publicly listed companies all over the world and leading not-for-profit institutions. Is Penn State or are other universities immune from such best practices?

If these governance and ethics oversight practices exist, they should be documented and accessible on Penn State’s website. That they are not leads me to believe they are ineffective or non-existent. (Note: the Penn State website appears to have changed slightly as of Sunday, November 13, 2011, to include backgrounds of 32 (was 35) directors.)

Next, more to the alleged sexual assaults on campus property by football coach Sandusky.

There needs to be greater rotation and succession planning at many universities and Penn State is no exception. The same director, employee, coach, dean, or otherwise at the helm for 20-30+ years – regardless of performance or money or donations being attracted – is wrong governance. Joseph Paterno was coach for 45 years and is 85 years old.

Inadequate succession planning like this would never fly in public companies, where CEO tenure is 4-5 years and good board tenure is 9. People don’t have time to get comfortable and start capturing people but need to do their job. On boards, retirement age is 72+ and good tenure is 9. In professional service firms, it is even earlier, from late 50s to early 60s to make way for the next generation of leaders.

No one is irreplaceable or larger than an institution. Incumbents create power and fiefdoms, currying favors – such as free sports tickets and equipment to young boys (as was alleged) – or protecting colleagues (also being alleged) – where they become so dominant they cannot be resisted, within pockets of toxic culture and risk – with management and even boards of trustees acquiescing instead of governing.

All allegations have yet to be proven, but if true this is likely what happened here: People become afraid to speak. If they speak, they will suffer enormous reprisals, even loss of their jobs or banishment. The board is at fault if this is the case as a result of a flawed structure (see above) and decisions it took or did not take.

At least half of the Penn State board should be businesspeople with clout. The board should have the same transparent recruitment that companies how have, with directors who are independent, have run businesses and can tell colleges who are behind the times, or who resist reform, that this is what has to happen. Having alumni, the governor, or even agricultural societies (likely a historical artifact) appoint or elect directors does not necessarily result in competent directors being at the table or staffing key committees. There needs to be a greater link – clear and transparent – between directors, their skills, and what is required to govern. The days of ceremonial appointments should be over. Clearly they are not.

Next, all colleges should have whistle-blowing procedures at the same level or above as companies are now obliged to do. This puts the heat under management to have proper procedures, as employees can go directly to an external ombudsperson or the regulator to get protection.

A code of conduct should be developed by all colleges and universities, as is the case for any leading organization. It should be signed off on by each and every trustee, employee and key supplier and be a condition of serving and employment, including for the president. Code compliance should be part of the president’s contract. Everyone has to sign that they do not know of any wrongdoing, directly or indirectly, anywhere on campus, every year. The sign-off statement should include obligations on how to report, protection mechanisms, and assurances of a proper independent investigation.

All code compliance should be reported directly to the audit committee of the Penn State board (note: non-existent at Penn State), and independently assured. The code must include conflicts of interest statements, treatment of assets, fair dealing and harassment. Training and education should also occur, for each employee. The code should be paramount and override defensive union agreements or guises of academic freedom.

Lastly, Penn State’s internal audit charter – if it exits – should be available on its website. The design and effectiveness of internal controls, including approvals, access to restricted rooms, campus security and lighting, keys, locks, areas of vulnerability, and potential for override – most of which were likely deficient in this case – should be reported directly to and overseen by the audit committee.  The audit committee should be able to insist upon independent assurance for any risk, based on the audit report. Good audit committees know and do all this. They direct the president, CFO and finance and risk personnel to comply with best practices.

Why would Penn State management do all this, under this resistance? Simple. The board tells them to. Or they get fired. This is why a strong board is so essential. The tone at the top starts – and stops – with the board. Sandusky is not a rogue any more than a rogue trader is at a bank. He is operating within a defective system, put in place by defective management and overseen by a defective board.

Conclusion: Reform to collegiate governance

Educational institutions are complex organizations, with interdependent stakeholders and many moving parts. They are sometimes more complex to run than a large company. In the vast majority of cases, they are staffed by committed and well-meaning people. They are however, hard to manage and especially difficult to govern, given defensive unions, historic tradition and tenured, specialized academics and staff. They are however taxpayer-funded entities from which leadership and accountability are expected. Indeed, they are supposed to set the example and practice what they teach.

It is very important that governance standards and practices be current and not myopic, and this is why colleges need strong, proper, effective independent boards to counteract resistance, have the clout to direct management and staff, and impose proper governance, risk management and internal controls are is being done for public companies.

Here, Penn State, and perhaps many other universities have much to learn.

The Boardroom of the Future: Changes that will reshape corporate governance

A global “mega-cap” company recently asked me to submit a briefing on how a boardroom of the future will look. This is an abridged summary of my report.

Democratization of governance

Your shareholders will nominate and elect your directors by electronic voting directly on your website. They will base their vote on the accomplishments of each director and track record of acting in the best interests of shareholders and the company overall.

Electronic registries and meetings will be the primary basis upon which shareholders select directors to your board. Director competencies will be fully disclosed.

Diversification of boardrooms

Your board will be 40% to 50% women and have far fewer CEOs on it in the next five to seven years. Your directors will be independent experts within their relevant strategic domains, will be quick studies, and will have access to the best learning of the company. They will request an Office of the Board be established. Board tenure will not exceed 9 years.

Corporate reporting

Reporting to shareholders will be fully integrated and online. Non-financial risks and internal controls will be independently assured. All reporting will be accessible, complete, accurate and independently validated.

Technology

Your board will be paperless and directors will have access to any piece of information they need to oversee and advise management. Technology will be used to attract and communicate with international directors. Risk appetite frameworks, established by the board, will translate into clear incentives and constraints using integrated firm-wide information systems.

Executive compensation

Executive compensation will be established by shareholder-directors. Professional standards will be imposed on any consultants retained by these directors. All compensation will be fully risk-adjusted and linked to performance. Current models and methods will change significantly.

Office of the Board

An Office of the Board will be established. It will house independent staff and resources available and accountable to the board and paid by the company.

 

Regulation of corporate governance

The unprecedented intrusion into the governance of companies will continue until most or all of the above reforms are implemented.

Conclusion

The above changes are significant and will fundamentally change the way directors are selected and how boards control management.