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The Penn State Report and 8 Must Dos for University Boards

The Penn State board of trustees did not escape blame in Louis Freeh’s 162 page report released this week. See the PDF summary here and pages 97-103 of the full report here on findings for the Board of Trustees.

The board had inadequate reporting procedures and committee structure, a poor tone at the top, was criticized for being a “rubber stamp,” and did not independently inquire and investigate.

What can university boards learn from this failure? A few things.

  1. Reduce your board size to 15, maximum. Penn State’s board was 32 members. Even the largest company boards have 12 directors on average. Larger boards tend to provide worst oversight when company size is held constant, the research shows. If you have a board this large, debate and decisions cannot occur – the board becomes ‘rubber stamp’ like Penn State’s was.
  2. Disestablish the executive committee. Executive committees dominated by university executives and a few directors creates a board within a board, which obviates the very need for the board and creates two classes of directors. It is a red flag for management control over the board. Executive committees have been disbanded in the corporate sector for this very reason.
  3. Have a rigorous code of conduct and compliance oversight, with reporting directly to a board committee. Have every university employee and key supplier sign the code and receive training on it. Have an independent and anonymous whistle blowing procedure. All good companies have these now and universities need to follow suit. Press on despite faculty associations’ allegations of breach of academic freedom.
  4. Have authority within board and committee charters to compel independent assurance and investigations, when the board or committee deems it appropriate. All good companies have this and universities do not. Penn State should have as the report states.
  5. Test tone in the middle and watch for pockets of undue influence. Tenure of 20-30 years in any position (coach, dean, director etc.) should be a red flag for improper succession planning. Insist on vacations, sabbaticals, term limits and regular leadership rotation and development for all positions.
  6. Select trustees on the basis of competencies and skills, not donations or favoritism. Restrict busy directors (3 or more directorships) as companies with busy boards tend to have worse long term performance and oversight, the research shows.
  7. Ask yourself whether all material risks (including compliance and reputation) of the university are reported and assured by the board and committee structure. Meet in executive session without management to discuss. Retain independent advisors to assist you if necessary. Insist that management implement full enterprise risk management.
  8. Lastly, insist on executive sessions where management leaves the room at every board and committee meeting. Pay particular attention to internal audit. This person should have adequate staff, resources, mandate and report directly to the board and audit committee, not management.

There are many shoes left to drop in the Penn State tragedy, including ensuing civil litigation. The vast majority of universities in my experience have not adopted the above recommendations for best practice. Many or most corporations, however, have. Universities and all educational institutions should not be immune from proper governance practices.

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Train wreck RIM and its dysfunctional board: Critics weigh in

New RIM CEO Thorsten Heins is in denial (see “RIM CEO Welcomes Critics to Happy-Fun Rainbow Land”). Investors view the company as in a death spiral. It has lost 95% of its value and is laying off 1000s of employees. RIM is expected to be sued for misrepresentation based on this denial.

A board, however, should never be in denial. Recall one of its directors, Roger Martin, stating that there was no one who could have replaced former co-CEOs Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis (see also

RIM BOARD MEMBER: Our Critics Are Idiots — We Had No Choice But To Run The Company Into The Ground). Martin was also highly critical of external criticism.

Now RIM is holding its annual general meeting this week wherein many of its current directors will be eligible for re-election.

It took the RIM board years to finally accede in 2012 to a non-executive chair (see the 8 page report here), a practice recommended in Canada since 1994. What about RIM’s directors? Did, or do, they have the right skills and competencies? Could this tragedy and waste of what was once the second largest Canadian company have been prevented? If so, how? What if the board of directors was actually effective? Drawing on posts and commentary within the LinkedIn group Boards and Advisors, some commentators weigh in.

On the composition of the RIM board, by experienced non-executive chair and activist investor Henry D. Wolfe:

“What might be the situation today regarding RIM’s performance and stockholder value if the following board had been in place:

1.           A strong non-executive chairman with a stellar track record of value creation, tough but non-autocratic leadership skills and a mindset of high expectations and shareholder value maximization. This individual would be the key to ensuring that board functioned with shareholder value maximization and management accountability fully at the forefront. In other words, he or she would provide the leadership and tone that brings the specific expertise of the directors into focus for the shareholders.

2.           Two marketing executives with the track record and experience that would be in alignment with RIM’s needs. The key here is not just marketing experience and track record but the specific type of marketing experience that is directly relevant and of value to RIM.

3.           Two technology executives with the track record and experience that would be in alignment with RIM’s needs. The key is the same here as noted above for the marketing oriented directors.

4.           One or two partners from a hedge fund like ValueAct Capital. ValueAct is an activist hedge fund that takes a cooperative approach with boards and management after making an investment and usually seek one or two board seats. They focus on technology companies and bring very sophisticated and exceptional value maximization skills to the boardroom.

5.           One or two additional directors selected based on other strategic or operational needs of RIM not addressed by the marketing and technology directors.

In other words, what if the board was selected based on RELEVANT skills (including value creation skills), expertise, track record and direct ability to add to the performance and ultimate value of RIM?”

On distancing RIM from its past, by CEO and non-executive director Lucy P. Marcus:

“RIM needs revolution, not evolution, and yet it has chosen to replace its co-CEOs with a company insider, Thorsten Heins, one of RIM’s two chief operating officers. While this may provide some continuity, what RIM needs right now are fresh eyes and ideas.

RIM’s newly appointed independent chair, Barbara Stymiest, has been on the board for five years, and though she comes with strong credentials, she may be too closely associated with past failures to be truly independent.”

On RIM’s governance review report, by former Federal Cabinet Minister and Member of Parliament, the Hon. Joseph Volpe:

“…a seven month gestation to produce an eight page, pro-forma note reflecting Management’s concession to the minimum requested by the Marketplace! As I read the report, the Board implicitly accepts the very passive role in the affairs of RIM that Management has assigned it. Perhaps, sadly, both Parties are right. The Co-CEOs developed a product, marketed it and created great wealth in the process for all involved. The Board, created and dominated by the Co-CEOs basked in that credit.”

On RIM’s current weaknesses and failings, by futurist, director and advisor Frank Feather:

“RIM was and is a one-trick pony. That is okay, so long as it keeps its innovative edge. But it also needs to seek out adjacencies to build other revenue streams, as Apple has demonstrated. …

But relying on technocratic founders and like-minded COO, the company stayed with its one-trick pony and even became complacent that growth and market leadership would continue forever – the mark of arrogance or laziness.

It is easy “not” to make decisions when things are going well. But not rocking the boat can be the worst risk, as has transpired. Again, the Board is at fault here.

As well, of course, flush with money, the founders went off on tangents, aspiring to acquire a sports franchise. Even if that had been successful, I doubt it would have brought any adjacent revenue to RIM. Meanwhile, the technical focus of RIM became negligent, as eyes and minds of the CEOs went elsewhere. The Board should have reigned them in and told them to focus on business or they would replace them as CEOs. The Board failed to act on this matter, and it greatly contributed to the company floundering.

So there is a long list of Board failings.

…I suggest that RIM would be an entirely different company today, with still a leading-edge product, indeed with a stable of complementary products, also with adjacent service revenues of some major significance. It would have been a slick value-generating machine.

RIM had (still has, IMHO) two major weaknesses: a weak Boardroom team, and a weak management team, with management leading the Board by the nose, and was short-sightedly focused on tweaking existing technology rather than creating new game-changing appliances and services. It is a class is case of myopia, and poor team development.”

On implementing major change, the role of the Chair, and CEO succession, by Henry D. Wolfe:

“When major change is needed, restructuring the board should be the FIRST step. I can speak to this first hand as my business focus has been and continues to be on dealing with under-performing companies. After an initial in-depth analysis, the first step is always a restructuring of the board before any further action is taken. Although there is more complexity involved than this comment section will allow, said simply, if you get the board right and laser focused on performance and value maximization, then all else will cascade down from that level. …

The big question regarding Stymiest is whether or not she has what it takes to LEAD and all that that implies. Will she be able to lead the board, including the necessary restructuring to turn around the company and ensure value maximizing strategies are evaluated and executed? Will she be tough enough to lead the board to hold the CEO and his team accountable for results? Will she be aggressive enough to ruffle feathers among incumbent directors to the degree needed? Will she be able to reverse the management driven nature of the board? …

One major flaw jumped out in Stymiest’s comments. The “succession plan” was developed by the former co-CEO’s rather than the board. The former co-CEOs initiated the execution of this plan, not the board. Her comments about independence of the board (and again, independence is overrated) ring hollow. As I suggested in a previous post re RIM, this is nothing more than a shuffle; it is not the shakeup that was needed. With a few exceptions, board made up of “corporate” people are incapable of a real shakeup.”

What are the chances that the above changes and reforms will occur? It is highly unlikely that they will if many or most of the current RIM directors are re-elected this week. What is needed at RIM is the avoidance of denial by the board; a demonstration of leadership; and directors with the relevant skills, experience and track records to restore value for shareholders.

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Eight Traps of Boardroom Diversity

There are myths and vested interests in the movement towards boardroom diversity now underway in several countries.

In this first of two blog posts, I consider the “traps” and embedded myths. In the second blog post to follow, in about a week’s time, I will propose solutions.

Here are the eight “traps” as I call them.

 

1.         The “Defining diversity downward” trap

“Diversity” itself as a word is used to shape the debate. Australia has a succinct definition: “‘Diversity’ includes gender, age, ethnicity and cultural background.” If diversity is undefined by a regulator (such as in the US), or there is inadequate guidance provided to companies, then companies can define diversity to suit their own agendas, such as diversity of “perspective” or “training” or “educational background.” This leads to the unintended consequence of a board of almost all white males claiming itself to be diverse when it is not. To drive this point home, I usually post a cartoon of white males sitting around a board table stating that they believe they are diverse because they attended different private schools.

“Moving the Needle,” which is the subtitle for the diversity debate favored by a few groups, is another example suggesting minimalist change.

“Competencies” and “attributes” (or qualifications for directors) also need to be defined and disclosed more fully, on a director-by-director basis, because these criteria for director selection have implications for the diversity movement. “CEO,” for example, is not a competency. (See the “We want a CEO” Trap below.)

2.         The “Business case” trap

“Show me the business case,” opponents to diversity argue, and proponents attempt to advance. The fact is that peer-reviewed empirical evidence is mixed in the effect that adding women to boards has upon corporate financial performance, as is the effect of boards themselves upon financial performance. Engaging in this debate is a distracting non-winning proposition. Perhaps the business case for men sitting on boards should also be established. The case for diversifying boards should be based on the effect on debate and decision-making within the boardroom, and on the full use of available talent and equity arguments (read: it is the right thing to do), not on downstream financial outputs.

3.         The “Be careful” trap

When women directors are advanced, a response received is “Be careful, as we need qualified directors” (or words carefully spoken or written to this effect). This assertion lacks any empirical support whatsoever. It was offered in Quebec when the Premiere mandated that women must receive parity on Quebec boards and the cultural make up must match that of communities in which the company operates. Proponents of this myth should bear the burden of establishing how women or minority directors are not “qualified” to sit on boards, and indeed what it means to be “qualified” to sit on a board.

When visible minorities as directors are advanced, such as African, Hispanic/Latinos and Asian Americans (whose proportion on boards are in the 1-3% range depending on the survey), the other “be careful” argument I receive is, to use the words of an Assistant Secretary of a large US company “corporate boards should not be designed to be all things to all people. It’s not necessarily in the best interest of a company to try to make the board look like the General Assembly of the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, or U.S. Supreme Court.”

My response to arguments like the above has been: “Listen, the numbers have flat-lined for women and minorities at 15-16% and 1-3% respectively for some time, so if and when boards look like the UN or we have too many women (which will likely never occur in my lifetime), then we can talk about hypothetical arguments. Until then, let’s confine ourselves to the evidence and the here-and-now. And, having multi-culturally diverse boards looking more like communities and emerging markets is especially important if a multinational company does business around the world.

4.         The “Entrenchment” trap

Stanford researchers content that only 2% of directors who step down are dismissed or not re-elected, out of a total universe of 50,000 directors. In other words, 98% of directors retire voluntarily. This needs to change so there is greater board renewal and turnover. Term limits of nine years are now instituted in the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. North American regulators should consider the effect that prolonged tenure has on director independence. Director tenure should be based on performance and it should be easier for shareholders to nominate and remove directors. Any board policy restricting entrenchment should not contain “grandfathering” (exempting existing directors) and should be decided by disinterested directors (and preferably shareholders) unaffected by the policy and free from undue influence of other directors or management.

5.         The “We want a CEO” trap

The expressed preference for CEO-directors (current or former) is based on a myth unsupported by research that CEOs make better directors. (It may be that CEOs prefer like-minded and sympathetic supporters.) Giving primacy to CEOs also has the effect of excluding diverse directors.

According to a study, 80% of directors believe active CEOs are no better than non-CEO directors. CEOs tend to be stretched, bossy, poor collaborators, and do not listen. Research also supports tenuous advantage of CEO-directors. Also, only 46% of directors believe former CEOs are above average.

“We want a CEO” may be “code” for women or minorities need not apply.

6.         The “It’s whom you know” trap

According to course materials I am using in my Harvard corporate governance course this summer, unlike executive recruitment, where interviews occur of a short list of candidates occur prior to making a choice, in director recruitment, candidates are instead ranked (1, 2, 3 and so on), and NOT interviewed. But rather, the first candidate is approached for a board position. The second and third candidates are approached only if the preceding candidate said “no.” There is no clear rationale for this anomalous recruitment practice and it has the unfortunate effect of excluding unknown but highly qualified candidate directors. It forces women into hyper-network mode because no interactive validation of competencies exist or opportunities to meet the nominating committee. This unfortunate practice perpetuates the “it’s whom you know,” mentality towards board directorship, rather than one’s competency and skills. Everyone loses when directorship is based on patronage, favors or nepotism. The board is weaker as a result.

7.         The “Prior experience” trap

There is no evidence of which I am aware confirming that first-time directors are less effective than long-serving directors, or the that the latter are more effective. The focus should be on underlying competencies and attributes and track record of accomplishment. See “Traditional benchmarks keep many women off boards…” Governance is a learned sport, just like anything else. And it is not rocket-science. The fact of the matter is that search firms and nominating committees should focus their efforts on validating and assuring competencies and intrinsics necessary to be a good director, such as integrity, leadership, mindset, industry track record, value creation process, shareholder representation and culture of equity ownership, communication, commitment and specific functional skills needed by the board – and not on an arbitrary metric of prior experience that may or may not relate to the above. The sooner this occurs, the better.

8.         The “Pipeline” or “Shallow pool” trap

Women have not made it to senior enough levels and the director talent pool is too shallow, is the final myth. Show me the evidence that this is the case. Perhaps boards are not looking hard enough. In my experience, which includes resume and profile assessment of some of the most senior C-suite women in North America, many of these candidates are markedly superior to the lesser-qualified incumbent directors. Perhaps the “pipeline” is full with qualified director candidates, and it is a mindset recruiting issue more than anything. As Deepak Shukla writes, “From my experience, every time I have attempted to start a discussion thread on the Institute of Corporate Directors’ group (mainly comprised of sitting board directors) on the subject of diversity, I have been greeted with a cold shoulder and an utter lack of responses!”

Join my blog next week where I will propose solutions to address the eight traps above, and action that should be taken by shareholders, search firms, nominating committees, industry associations and regulators to propel boardroom diversity into action.

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Should Barclays’ Former CEO receive £17M in Compensation After the Libor Rate-Rigging Scandal?

Compensation drives behavior. As reported in The Telegraph, the Barclays’ board of directors intends to “ask” former CEO Bob Diamond to “cut” part of his £17M pay package in the aftermath of Diamond’s role in artificially suppressing the rate at which banks lend money to each other (otherwise known as the London Interbank Offered Rate, or “Libor”). There is an ensuing parliamentary inquiry into conspiracy by other banks to rig the Libor rate. Sky News reports, in “Lawyers In Barclays Bonus Battle,” that “investors have been warned that the bank faces a battle to fully withhold bonuses owed to Bob Diamond and Jerry del Missier, two top executives who quit the bank last week.”

There should be no “battle” and no need for the board to “ask” the CEO to relinquish compensation, given what happened, if the board is doing its job. The compensation (cash and stock) should not have been awarded or vested to Bob Diamond in the first place, if the Barclays’ board (and other bank boards) is complying with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s guidance.

Boards have wide leverage to align ethical conduct and internal controls with executive compensation far more aggressively than they appear to be.

There are two main tools: “clawbacks” and “malus.” Clawbacks, mandated by Dodd-Frank in the US, are more popular, but are inferior to malus. Clawbacks means the cash and equity vests to the executive, and depending on risk and performance factors, the compensation committee has an uphill battle to recover (or ‘claw back’) the compensation it already awarded to the executive. The executive no doubt will contest such efforts.

In contrast, “malus,” which is recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basel”) (see the May 2011 report here at pages 37-39), means that the awarding of cash and vesting of stock in the hands of the executive does not occur until and unless the compensation committee says it does. This type of discretion is exactly what management does not want, which is discretion in the compensation committee’s hands. Basel however maintains that malus clauses are more feasible to implement or enforce than are clawbacks. And they are right. Basically, with clawbacks (e.g., Barclays), the board has to pursue the executive for compensation already paid, whereas malus means the board has discretion to make the award in the first place. The board can wait to see if there are any “hidden” risks (e.g., Barclays’ Libor scandal, JP Morgan’s derivative loss) or performance effects that have yet to be fully realized.

Barclays is reported to have a clawback provision, as to many of the major banks, but it is unclear whether banks also have malus clauses. If not, they should.

The clawback and malus clauses should not be drafted by an internal or external legal or compensation firm or person who serves, or has or intends to serve, management. (Otherwise there is no independence and the clause will have a low bar and be management friendly.) The malus and clawback provisions should be drafted by an independent, expert service provider retained by and accountable to the board.

Basel offers guidance on provisions that leading banks have used within malus clauses, including: (i) breach of the code of conduct (this occurred with SNC Lavalin’s former CEO) and other internal rules; (ii) compliance with risk protocols and a qualitative assessment of risk by the compensation committee; and (iii) a violation of internal rules or external regulations.

If the board doesn’t have a proper clawback and malus clause, there will be no shared understanding and alignment of behavior with compensation.

In short, if the board wants an executive to focus on ethics and commit the resources necessary to have proper internal controls and prevent management override, tie his or her compensation to these outcomes – before the fact, and retain discretion at all times. Doing this – which executives will resist – will focus executives’ minds to do what is right as their money is on the line. This is exactly what regulators want in the aftermath of the financial crisis. And clawbacks and malus clauses for banks will likely migrate to non-banks as all companies will be expected to have risk-adjusted compensation in the future.

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Shining a light on NHL governance and concussions

Hundreds of former players are suing the National Football League and equipment manufacturers for head injuries and other damage, saying concussion data was ignored by the league and it had a duty to protect players.

This litigation could be precedent for a similar lawsuit against the National Hockey League. Concussions and the associated neurological damage are a problem in Canada’s game – “the fastest game without an engine.” The players and equipment are bigger, faster, stronger and harder, but the rinks and rules of the game have not kept up. And we have credible medical evidence now that we didn’t have before.

For examples of concussion damage, see “Concussion numbers were staggering in NHL’s 2011 and 2012,” the YouTube video “Suffering in Silence: NHL concussion issue,” more press here and here, and USA Today’s “NHL concussion tracker” (with 100 pictures).

See just some of the medical evidence here, and Peter Mansbridge’s coverage of the “Brain Lab That Could Change Hockey.” And, as many hockey fans know, Sidney Crosby’s performance may never fully recover from hits to his head.

The question is, is the NHL’s Commissioner, Gary Bettman, listening? What about the board?

Sporting governance is shrouded in mystery. Transparency International, in “Corruption and sport: building integrity and preventing abuses,” writes,

“There is generally a low level of transparency in many sport associations when it comes to publicly sharing information and documentation. This often linked to the disclosure practices of team owners — who are often individuals or companies. This characteristic is troubling given the process for making internal decisions and conducting elections in national and international sport organisations. Board members of international federations as well as members of working committees are often expected to vote unanimously, with dissenting votes not registered in the minutes. Such practices prevent any real accountability, both for the boards and for sport in general.”

In analyzing boards, I scrutinize the governance practices of the organization, compared to best practice, and how decisions were made, or not made. Here are just some issues I see with the NHL’s governance:

  • Gary Bettman has been NHL Commissioner (which means “CEO”) since 1993. A tenure of almost 20 years for any CEO is highly anomalous. I would want to know the NHL Board’s plans for CEO succession, and whether it meets in closed session to discuss succession. I would also want to see Mr. Bettman’s position description, which is common now for CEOs.
  • Mr. Bettman’s salary was, according to the National Post, US$7.5M for the year ending June 30, 2010. It was 3.7M in the 2004-05 season. Here, I would want to know how Mr. Bettman’s salary and incentive structure is set by the Board, what the performance metrics are (e.g., expansion, relocation, revenue targets, growth rates, television and radio metrics, etc.), and whether the metrics and compensation are risk-adjusted, including health and safety. I would, in short, examine how Mr. Bettman’s compensation drives his behavior.
  • Every board has to identify and oversee risk. Here I would want to know the reporting and assurance protocols the NHL Board used and/or rejected for incorporating medical evidence for concussions in its oversight of management, rule-setting and strategy for the league.
  • Every board has to have a reporting and accountability structure independent of executive management. Here I would want to know why the Board meets only twice a year (see “NHL’s secret constitution revealed”), what independent directors sit on the board, what the reporting and decision-making structures are, how rule-setting occurs, and the independent assurance and internal controls over player safety and league reputation.
  • Lastly, I would want to know why there is minimal at best disclosure over governance on the NHL website. There are opportunities for development in this regard.

As the lawyers allege in their statement of claim suing the NFL:

“The NFL, like the sport of boxing, was aware of the health risks associated with repetitive blows producing sub-concussive and concussive results and the fact that some members of the NFL player population were at significant risk of developing long-term brain damage and cognitive decline as a result,” the complaint charges.

“Despite its knowledge and controlling role in governing player conduct on and off the field, the NFL turned a blind eye to the risk and failed to warn and/or impose safety regulations governing this well-recognized health and safety problem.”

We will see how this lawsuit plays out. In the interim, perhaps we might consider that the game might be better served by those who lead it coming to grips with advancements in medical research and what it is telling the sport about how the game is being played. Perhaps there are better governance practices in particular that could be put in place in order to help the game thrive in the future.

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