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This blog is intended to be a governance resource and source of current governance commentary, offered by a corporate governance academic engaged in research, teaching and other ongoing academic activities. There is a very public element to the governance field, and it is hoped that this blog will contribute to the public discussion of current governance issues. It is also hoped that it will address a need in the governance field by presenting a holistic online approach to the topic. There is a rapid rate of change in the field of governance (public, private, government and not-for-profit entities) and developments in internet technology move swiftly. This governance blog offers resources for a broad variety of stakeholders including: [...more]




Why Corporate Boards Lack Courage

Last night on the national news, embattled imaging-seller Kodak was compared to Research in Motion by a commentator comparing both companies’ inability to exploit advantages that they originally created. Regarding Kodak, one younger woman who was interviewed remarked, “What is film?”

A few weeks ago, I took a friend into a Black’s Photography store to have a digital picture taken for a LinkedIn profile picture. I asked the employee if he could take several digital pictures and email them to us so we could select one. The person had not even heard of social media, let alone LinkedIn, and said that the store could only take passport photos in hard copy form. Then we drove up the street to another picture store. This time we were told that there is a $300 “sitting fee” to have a picture taken. I took my friend’s picture myself with my digital camera and we downloaded the picture into LinkedIn in less than 15 minutes. I replaced my blackberry phone with an iPhone about three years ago. I doubt these photography stores – and maybe even RIM – will exist in their present form in the next few years.

Kodak is on the brink of bankruptcy. Three of its directors resigned this week. In a Harvard Business Review blog, an adjunct professor Simon Wong wrote a post questioning whether independent directors should flee their companies in times of trouble. Wong argued that it’s problematic for such directors to leave when they are “most needed.” Professor Michael Useem from Wharton maintained that leadership means you “stay the course.”

I would argue the opposite. The very people who caused the problem are unlikely the ones to solve it. These directors are probably “least needed.”

The question is not whether failed directors should stay on boards, but why they were not replaced sooner. Directors should be much easier to hire and fire by shareholders. Today, it’s virtually impossible to do either easily. These two things need to change for corporate governance to improve.

Kodak’s business model should have changed two years ago and maybe if shareholders could replace the directors more easily who were incapable of changing the management and business model, this actually would have been better.

Shareholders should not have to fight long, expensive public relations or proxy battles or arm-twist behind closed doors to effect change because they have no legal channel to do otherwise. Right now in Canada, shareholders cannot even vote “against” a director (they must either vote “for” or “withhold”), and a director can be elected to a board with a single vote “for” under existing legislation. This also needs to change to give power to shareholders to nominate and replace board members of the companies they own.

Currently, troubled boards drag their feet, are silent, write letters, conduct studies, avoid meetings, and refrain from making the tough changes necessary. They do so simply because they can. We see examples of this almost on a weekly basis. Why is this so? Self-interest and lack of courage.

The self-interest is obvious. Directors are conflicted as they are assessing their own performance and would rather not advocate their own replacement. Change will unlikely come from within.

Regarding lack of courage, experienced non-executive chair and activist investor, Henry D. Wolfe, a member of the LinkedIn Group, Boards and Advisors, when speaking of directorial courage from an investor’s perspective, wrote yesterday:

“From an investor’s perspective, if I am aware that directors in a company in which I have a position are acting cowardly because they fear the ramifications, then I would be inclined to take action to replace those directors with individuals who will not shirk from taking the action necessary, including speaking their mind, to aggressively pursue the maximization of the funds that I have invested.”

Why do boards lack courage, or the willingness to act during non-performance and significant declines in shareholder value? Three reasons: they are not truly independent (I have written about director independence earlier); they lack the recent and relevant industry experience to know what to do; and they lack leadership. They therefore become captured by management, defaulting to process and denial rather than making tough choices in the interests of shareholders.

Corporate governance is a rather genteel sport at present. Many directors of companies have not led or significantly influenced the very industries as executives on whose corporate boards they sit. Be it technology, transportation, mining or financial services, if you scrutinize failed or underperforming boards or companies – really scrutinize – this serious shortcoming – the lack of industry experience and leadership – will become obvious. Many more directors need to have been the primary person responsible for driving superior performance and redefining competitive dynamics within the industry for corporate boards to be effective. These directors should be sourced globally. Local accountants, lawyers, business school deans, consultants, politicians, and even CEOs of unrelated industries are nice but they should be the minority. A majority of these latter individuals is not the recipe for an effective board. Sadly, many corporate boards look like this, are dated, and are in dire need of renewal and diversification.

Lastly, and most importantly, boards need to be independently led, in substance and form. First and foremost, the nonexecutive chair should have a deep and full understanding of value creation for shareholders and a mindset for the longer term; be disciplined and focused on strategy development and execution; and be able to lead and inspire – really lead – independent directors and maximize their engagement, performance and focus on the most critical objectives. Any board that is ineffective likely has an ineffective chair.

Then, and only then – when a board is independent, composed of industry leaders, and effectively led – will it rise up and have the will to act. The fact this has not happened yet in many troubled companies means change must occur by shareholders rather than from within. Regulators would be well served to enable corporate governance changes to be facilitated by investors.

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Getting on Boards ~ Practical Pointers That Work

Do you think the average board can afford to pay a search firm $80,000 to recruit a director? Of course not.

One major shift is the impact of technology and diversification of boards on creating recruitment opportunities for new and often first-time directors.

Here are the opportunities and advice for becoming a member of a board of directors, based on recommendations I have given to directors, executives and boards.

1.      Network, network, network – and now “connect”

LinkedIn, online databases and other social media tools (e.g., groups) are now at least as —if not more— important as paper resumes, rolodexes, email, business cards and reference letters once were. Most prospective directors are 2-3 degrees of separation between themselves and the ideal board or decision-maker. Social media has enabled the playing field to become much more equal and accessible in linking supply (boards) and demand (directors), particularly for younger and diverse directors. Boards and directors would both be well served to use this new medium. It is efficient, effective and inexpensive.

Second, if you are aspiring to be a director, you should become known to advisory firms (law, accounting, consulting) as often they are asked to serve but can’t because they’re conflicted or it’s a liability issue: they can recommend you and look good. Advisors however are beholden to their clients, not the director. The person who best represents a director is the director.

Third, you should also be known by shareholders, who in the future may be nominating directors directly. See this new database for example.

But ultimately it is you who best represents your interests. The networking rests with you, not an intermediary.

Also, become a member of the ICD, NACD or IoD or one in your country (AICD, IoDSA, NZIOD, etc.). It is a wise investment, for education, webinars and networking.

2.      Target and tailor your search

Volunteer, advisory, charitable, hospital, university, college and government (“crowns” as they are called in Canada) corporations all have boards. There are 100s if not 1000s of boards, including in your local community, and they all need directors on an ongoing basis. Many have (or should have) online application platforms. See Ontario for example, or federal government boards. Registration is (or should be) free. Director associations also have online registries for members. See here and here. These are excellent as well.

Target your contacts – the top 25-50 best list say, who really know you and can vouch for you, to people they can recommend (often it’s the 2nd or 3rd degree of separation that counts).

Read papers and online as more and more board positions will be advertised, but again it is who you know and your networks that really matter.

Target boards with term limits, high turnover and diversity. Approach them directly, including being introduced to directors or the chair of the nominating committee on LinkedIn or otherwise, via your connections. You don’t need an intermediary to make contact with the right board or director.

Be patient, tactful but deliberate too, in promoting yourself, that you are available, have the time, and would be a good director.

Also, don’t listen to people who tell you that you need to wait to be “asked” to serve. This is a veiled attempt to suppress you. Position yourself to be in the right place at the right time (luck is preparation meeting opportunity).

2.      Manage your resume and profile

Your resume (or even LinkedIn profile) will get you the interview. Your interview will get you the position.

Most cv’s I review for directors can be improved. They are for hierarchical and command-and-control organizations and managerial positions, not a board of directors, which is a group of peers.

Good boards now have competency matrixes (I recommended this and we are one of the few countries with this requirement explicitly). The NACD has also endorsed the idea of a skills matrix. Boards want to see core competencies you bring to the table, and how your background and experience support these competencies. Prospective directors need to connect their portfolios seriatim to the competencies and other attributes looked to, for and by directors. The four most important are leadership, financial literacy, industry knowledge and softer skills such as impact, influence, teamwork, integrity, communication style, and a bias to learn. And leadership is by no means synonymous with “CEO,” but includes NFP, SME, professional, project and issue leadership as well. Bring your top competencies up front, and have no more than six to eight.

Also, leverage your contacts, languages and international experience, particularly in emerging markets or where the company and management team wants to be (in particular China and India). Don’t rule out serving on boards outside of Canada who seek trade or do business with Canada.

Attend conferences, speak, sit on panels and manage your profile so you become known in the industry or sector you are targeting.

3.      Get educated on governance and serve for the right reasons

If you have been out of school for 20 years, get some governance education. The world has changed, and this field is turning over constantly since 2002. The Institute for Corporate Directors, Directors College, and the National Association for Corporate Directors offer excellent programs. There are excellent programs at Stanford, Harvard, Kellogg and The Directors’ Consortium. Spend the time and money to become current, and be seen to be. Also, join a LinkedIn group, such as Boards & Advisors. (It’s free!)

Don’t worry about money when serving on boards. Most directors serve to contribute, network, make a difference, have fun, stay young, and learn. The experience you gain can be leveraged into larger paying boards later.

 

4.      Prepare for the interview

Your interview and references will get you the board position.

Take the interview very seriously. Every word coming out of your mouth matters and will be scrutinized. You will probably be interviewed by two or more directors or the nominating committee. Prepare a binder with highlights and stickies. Bring it to the lunch or meeting. Know the business; know the company and management team; know the accounting and measurement issues for the policies and estimates; know the competitors; and know the top strategic issues. Show you will hit the ground running and add value. If the board is important to you, take at least a full week to prepare. It will make a difference and will be noticed.

And have references and sponsors that can absolutely go to bat for you (who have known you for 20 years, who may not necessarily have profile).

5.      Negotiate effectively at all stages

 

Being asked onto a board is a bit of a dance. Create a demand and don’t look desperate: position yourself as a valuable commodity who can contribute. There are certain questions you should ask however to determine the right fit. See my article here.

6.      If you have been on the board over 9 years, it’s probably time to go

 

Now it’s time to address current directors. It is very hard for shareholders to “fire” directors at present, but this too will likely change in the next few years.

At present, what is holding board turnover and renewal back are directors who place personal interests ahead of those of the organization. This is an integrity issue. No director is irreplaceable. If a director has been on the board over nine years, regulatory best practice is that that director is no longer regarded as independent. Such directors need to do the right thing and step down to make way for succession and renewal.

This means chairs have to have tough “let’s have a chat or take a walk” discussions with these directors, and lead by example. If the chair is the problem him or herself (more than five years, let’s say), then a group of directors or the chair of the nominating committee should “have a chat” with the chair. Lifetime appointments and directors serving 10-25 years are blocking renewal of new directors. Succession planning and term limits should be explicit to avoid directors who stay on way past their best before date and create uncomfort for colleagues and prospective directors. This is not a discriminatory issue but is a matter of renewal and good succession – the same as the board requires for management. Boards must lead by example. Management knows when a board is dated and is less useful to them.

7.      Choose your first board and industry wisely and invest the time

Your work on your first board will determine your second, third board and so on – like your degree after college gets your first job, and your performance then on after is what matters.

The first few boards are the hardest, take the most time, but mean the most.

Count on spending 200-300 hours all in, per board, especially if you are not from the sector. This figure may be across all boards, from public companies to not-for-profits. The risks, obligations and liability may be no different.

Don’t over extend or over promise; the directors on your first board will be your referees for your second: so choose wisely.

On your first board, have mature confidence, leadership, judgment and contribute and communicate. Be polished and a team player; but be independent, competent and rigorous.

8.      Be mentored and leverage onto other boards

Lastly, find a mentor and get candid data on your performance, right down to tone, words, preparation, style and contribution.

Go from not for profits, to health, education and government boards, to private boards, to SME traded, to traded large over 4-8-10+ years: have a governance trajectory.

Above all, be positive and patient: the whole field is changing.

 

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Compensation Consultants Need to Professionalize

Charlie Munger, Vice-Chairman of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, once said “As for corporate consultants who advise [boards of directors] on salary, all I can say is that prostitution would be a step up for them.”

Compensation consultants are widely regarded as not being independent and beholden to management for the bulk of their professional services. Therein lies the problem.

Boards need professional advisors who are accountable to boards and not management. They need auditors, lawyers, compensation consultants and search firms. However, these advisors have varying degrees of professionalism and oversight of conflicts of interest. Lawyers and accountants, for example, have very detailed rules of professional conduct. So do management consultants. See here, here and here. North American compensation consultants do not appear to have an industry code of conduct or performance standards.

Enron and WorldCom – and its legislative aftermath known as “Sarbanes Oxley” – fundamentally changed the relationship between auditors and audit committees. Auditors are now accountable directly to audit committees, not management or the CFO, to recommend to shareholders approval of financial statements of the company. Auditors may not engage in what is known as “non-audit” services to management, without permission, as doing so compromises integrity of the audit and accountability by the auditor to the audit committee.

The global financial crisis – and its legislative aftermath known as “Dodd Frank” – is similarly changing the relationship between compensation consultants and compensation committees. Consultants are now accountable directly to compensation committees, not the CEO, to recommend to shareholders the approval of executive compensation. Similarly, compensation consultants should not engage in “non-compensation” services to management, without permission, as doing so compromises their accountability to the compensation committee. But many consultants do. Their firms perform services for both management and the board, and doing so compromises the ability to do the best job for both.

Lawyers and accountants cannot act for two parties whose interests have the capacity to become adverse. A husband and a wife in a divorce; a vendor and a purchaser in a sale; and yes a CEO and a board in pay negotiations – all have potentially adverse interests, particularly if the professional is doing his or her job properly.

Respecting confidentiality, managing conflicts of interests, and the ability to advocate for one’s client, are the hallmarks of a profession.

Compensation committees and boards should insist on an industry-wide rigorous code of conduct for compensation consultants ~ that is independently drafted and enforced; that is publicly accessible; and to which all compensation consultants who advise these compensation committees subscribe.

The “Code of Conduct for Compensation Consultants” should be detailed, as are codes for lawyers and auditors. It should address specifically the following areas: the organization of a professional practice; relations with other firms and members; duties and obligations to your client; conflicts of interest; confidentiality (including privacy walls); competency and quality assurance; fees and retainers; monitoring and discipline; and, most importantly, objectivity, independence and integrity.

Compensation consulting firms and the industry as a whole have a choice – indeed they have a leadership and business development opportunity. They can professionalize themselves, collectively, collegially and independently, or governments eventually may do it for them. They may not like the unintended consequences of the latter.

 

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The Magna Situation and Overdue Corporate Governance Reform

This week, it was revealed that Messrs. Michael Harris, Louis Lataif and Donald Resnick, former members of a Special Committee whose role was to assess a related-party transaction involving control person Frank Stronach, all received overwhelming “withhold” votes compared to “for” votes cast by shareholders (62% “withhold” votes vs. 38% “for” for each).

This is a clear message by Magna shareholders that these individuals lack support and a mandate.

More importantly, this is a teachable moment for reforming Canadian corporate governance practices, particularly in respect of controlling shareholders and related party transactions. Many Canadian companies have “dual share” structures whereby a person(s) can control appointments to a board of directors –even with a minority of the total equity– and engage in transactions between themselves and the corporation (otherwise known as a “related-party” transaction, or transactions with insiders). These transactions, and the directors who oversee them, should be subject to greater scrutiny in my view.

Here are some proposals for reform:

Majority Voting: To begin with, each director of each board each year should receive a majority of votes cast by shareholders, plain and simple. If they do not, they should be required to resign, with shareholders nominating a replacement director who has majority support. “Withhold” votes should be changed to “Against” votes and the system simplified. All director votes should be disclosed and the system transparent.

Director Independence: Director independence should be changed from what the board believes to be the case (as it is now), to a more objective standard. In Magna’s case, Mr. Harris received $749,710 in total compensation in 2010. This is anomalous for a non-executive director position in my view. Irrespective of Mr. Harris, it is reasonable for a quantum this large for part-time work to receive scrutiny in terms of potential impact (or not) on the independence of that director. Mr. Resnick, a second person on the special committee, has been on the Magna board since 1982. This length of service is also anomalous. It is equally reasonable for this length of director service to be subject to objective scrutiny. A “9 year” independence limit is now law in the UK, whereby directors exceeding nine years service are presumed to no longer be independent. These are just two examples of how implementing a reasonable person standard for director independence could call into question the independence of incumbent or prospective directors. Other examples include director interlocks, personal associations and affiliations with firms who supply services to the company.

Minority vs. Controlling Shareholders: Next, directors representing minority shareholders who are independent of both management and the controlling shareholder should be placed on boards with a controlling shareholder. This brings greater objectivity and independence and oversight of potential conflicts of interest such as related party transactions. These directors should be elected directly by minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder should have no undue influence on this election.

Special Committees: The rules for special committees also need to change, particularly in overseeing insider transactions. Above a certain monetary threshold, for example, boards should be required to appoint an independent expert to provide an impartial opinion on the terms and conditions of the transaction and its impact on minority shareholders. Special committees should be composed only of directors who affirmatively declare they are independent (objective standard), directly or indirectly, of all parties and matters being discussed and considered. Interested parties should have no influence whatsoever. Terms of reference for the special committee should be disclosed and records maintained. Previous advisors to the company should be prohibited from advising the special committee. These reforms would go a long way to tightening up the role of special committees in overseeing potential conflicts of interest with company insiders.

Voting on the Transaction: Significant insider transactions above should require approval at a general meeting. Minority shareholders should be given a chance to oppose the resolution approving the transaction. Controlling shareholders should be precluded from voting on the transaction as they are self-interested in it.

Will the above reforms be implemented? They should. Unlike the US, Canada has been struggling with enormous powers of controlling shareholders since the inception of corporate governance guidelines some 20 years ago. Given our ownership patterns of companies –and ability of persons, families or even foreign corporations to exert control over companies, and potentially extract benefits– it is high time these above issues are resolved.

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Canada scores an “F” in preparing for the diversity tsunami

The US, UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden either have or are mid-way through changing laws on the books to promote greater gender and ethnic diversity on boards of directors since the financial crisis.

Diversifying corporate boards has been described as the number one issue in corporate governance. The movement is so broad that it is coined in New Zealand as the global governance “tsunami.” Governments are now very serious about who is sitting in boardrooms and ensuring that boards are no longer asleep at the switch.

Where is Canada in addressing board diversity? The 2005 corporate governance guidelines – which are now out of date: there is only one sentence on risk management for example – do not address boardroom diversity. Political leadership, with the exception of Quebec, has been absent.

Why is boardroom diversity so important? Because it leads to better decisions, which are what boards do. Women and directors from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds are less socially embedded than a homogenous group – a “closed shop” as it was described in the UK last week – and are more apt to challenge, monitor and control management the academic evidence reveals. The UK Prime Minister has said that increasing women on boards would help to drive down an astonishing 49% increase in directors’ pay. Institutional shareholders are now talking about voting “no” to nominating committee directors whose boards lack female representation.

Boards will not diversify on their own. There is entrenched self-interest to maintain the status quo. The status quo is to accord primacy to fellow CEOs (who are almost always male). Yet there appears to be scant evidence that CEOs make for more effective directors. Indeed the evidence appears to be the opposite. Second, long-serving directors (who are also largely male) do not stand down and a board is a fixed size, thus blocking renewal and diversification. In the UK, another change after the financial crisis is that any FTSE director serving beyond 9 years is presumed to no longer be independent. Canada has a significant number of male directors who exceed this limit and in some cases have served 15-25 years on a board. In addition, shareholders do not have “proxy access” (yet), meaning that the board and management largely selects itself, rather than being selected by shareholders. In short, the deck is stacked against diversification.

The figures bear this out. Depending on the survey, women have been stagnant at 9-14% for the last 10+ years. The figures for minority directors are much worse, at 3-4% (and these figures are generous). This is a global talent and competitiveness issue for companies and countries.

What is needed to prompt greater boardroom diversity? Political attention and leadership. A Canadian case in point: Quebec Premiere John Charest announced in 2007 that all Quebec boards of directors are to achieve gender parity by December 2011 (this month) – meaning equal number of men and women; and that the boards of Quebec companies are to much match the cultural make up of Quebec, reflecting the various components of Quebec society. And all director appointments are to be based on skills and experience profiles.

Governments prompt diversity in four ways.

1.         The first way is to do nothing and hope for the best, which is where Canada (but not Quebec) currently lands.

2.         The second way – exemplified by the US – is to mandate that all listed companies must disclose diversity plans for boards and senior management, but without defining diversity. The advantage of this is disclosure of a plan. The disadvantage is that lawyers define diversity downward to include diversity of “perspective” or “background,” whereby a non-diverse board could actually claim to be “diverse,” thereby obviating the intent to achieve gender and ethnic diversity.

3.         The third way – exemplified by Australia – is for the regulator to define diversity and require progress disclosure by companies in setting and achieving their own objectives based on the definition. Australia defines diversity for example as “gender, age, ethnicity and cultural background.” The figures for these groups have been steadily increasing ever since.

4.         The fourth approach – exemplified by Quebec and Norway – is full-fledged quotas – 40% women in Norway and 50% women plus cultural matching in Quebec. This obviously is the biggest stick a government can wield, and there are advantages clearly in the certainty of achieving imposed targets, without gaming definitions or feet dragging.

The best, most flexible approach is a variant of # 3, which is to define diversity – as a guideline or principle – and then hold companies responsible for achieving their own objectives and practices, through a comply or explain approach.

What is not acceptable is to do nothing, especially when the rest of the world is passing Canada by. The right directors can make or break a board. It’s time not only for companies – but also for governments – and in particular the Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, to focus on this issue.

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