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Rethinking what it means to be an “independent” director

I remember an institutional shareholder speaking at a corporate governance conference and proclaiming that what boards of directors need most is “unconflicted directors giving unconflicted advice.”  “Unconflicted” directors – otherwise known as “independent” directors without ties to the company or its management – are thought to be disinterested and more effective at monitoring management and operating in the best interests of the company overall.

Assessing whether directors are conflicted, however, occurs differently compared to that of senior management and other employees.

In directors’ cases, the assessment of conflicts is done by the board, inside the boardroom. Directors assess whether they have “material relationships” that could be “reasonably expected” to interfere with their “independent judgment.”

There is no reason why the review of independence of directors should not be subject to an objective standard of reasonableness, as it is for managers and other employees, to accompany the subjective view of individual directors.

For management and employees, conflicts of interest are subject to senior management or board of directors review (typically under a Code of Conduct). The perception of a conflict is as important – if not more important – than whether the manager believes he or she is conflicted.

A good conflict policy focuses not only on the subjective view of the manager or employee, but an objective “reasonable perception” viewpoint as well. A manager could believe that he or she is not conflicted, but when a relationship is viewed through an objective lens, the perception of a conflict may exist.

Directors may be subjectively of a view that a director or group of directors may not be conflicted, but that view may not be objectively reasonable. Further, social connections among directors, and between the directors and the CEO, may not be reflected in formal independence standards, or even detected. We saw this recently in News Corp whose directors had social and personal connections to Rupert Murdoch. Lucy Marcus and Nell Minow have done very effective jobs scrutinizing the statutory independence of News Corp directors, who have direct ties company management and the controlling shareholder. Media stories and scrutiny breeds skepticism and undermines the credibility of good boards.

My own research suggests that formal independence standards may not equate with independence of mind within a boardroom. A CEO may try to “capture” a director through gifts, trips, vacations, charitable contributions, jobs for his or her children, and other forms of social favoritism (documented in my research). Long serving or “interlocked” directors, or directors with affiliations to service providers, may also not have independence of mind.

Directors may quite simply be the CEO’s friends.

A few weeks ago at a research symposium I attended at University of Texas, a paper was presented that addressed the pre-existing social connections with the CEO that independent directors had. The finding by Professor Huijing Fu were that these social connections between the CEO and directors compromised the board’s ability to monitor.

Boards are afforded considerable latitude in terms of how they assess their own conflicts of interest, and perhaps this shortcoming should be addressed. Directors may have vested interests in having narrow, limited, subjective categorical standards of independence. Lawyers may as well, in providing assurance to clients.

The review of conflicts of interest is crucial, as corporate governance effectiveness – including oversight of transactions between insiders by a subset of independent directors – is underpinned in large measure by whether directors – including the Board Chair – are independent or not. Proxy advisory and rating agencies tend to assess director independence by the outputs or decisions a board takes. Perhaps independence should be scrutinized earlier on, before decisions are taken or even before directors come to the boardroom.

It is time to rethink how the independence of directors is assessed.

 

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Alleged Fraud at York University

A few questions:
1. When Navigant was retained in 2009, was this firm retained by, and accountable to, a Special Committee of only independent Governors of York U, or by Management? Best practice, generally, would be that an independent committee of a board would directly oversee an investigation of a significant matter involving potential fraud and reputational impairment, generally, as internal audit and control procedures over financial reporting may need to be strengthened, and management would not be overseeing the assessment of its own work, potentially.

2. Why is it that York U, to the best of my knowledge, information & belief, does not have a code of conduct that all employees and key suppliers must sign off on annually, as well as an established whistle-blowing procedure? (These are also common best practices, since S-Ox in 2002, including for not-for-profit institutions. Potential fraud often does not occur in a vacuum and a code and whistle-blowing are effective deterrents, for a board to oversee potential fraud within an institution. Code compliance and whistle-blowing reporting should also reach directly an audit committee of a board, or its equivalent. The SEC also implemented a new rule that potential whistleblowing can now go directly to the regulator, as an indication of where best practices are emerging in terms of codes and whistle-blowing practices.)

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Fraud and Corruption Allegations at Sino-Forest Corp – Lessons for Chinese and Indian Companies in Meeting Western Corporate Governance Practices

China and India collectively represent a market of 2.5 billion people with GDP growth rates hovering around 9%. Clearly they are lucrative markets for Anglo-American companies. These countries are, however, two of the most corrupt nations in the world, ranking 78th and 87th, respectively, according to Transparency International’s corruption index. Canada, the UK and US rank 6th, 20th and 22nd. If Chinese and Indian companies seek access to public money from western capital markets, to integrate more fully within the global economy, they must reform their corporate governance and accounting practices.

It is not enough to rationalize Chinese and Indian companies at present as “investor risks.” Market regulators, representing the public interest whose mandate it is to protect investors, have an obligation to require compliance with listing standards and act when this is not the case.

Boards of directors of companies listed on Canadian, American and British stock exchanges have an obligation to be independent and effective. Directors should be judicious when accepting directorships of Indian and Chinese companies, as they could very easily become ensnared in alleged violations of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or the new UK Bribery Act.

The Ontario Securities Commission recently ordered senior executives of Sino-Forest Corp. to resign. Subsequently, the Chair and CEO of Sino Forest resigned amid an internal review of fraud allegations. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently established a task force to address abuses by Chinese companies accessing US markets through “reverse mergers.” Twenty-five NYSE listed Chinese companies have disclosed accounting discrepancies or have seen their auditors resign, shares have been halted in more than twenty Chinese companies, and five Chinese companies have been delisted.

The Satyam case in India represents a high-water mark for fraud and defective corporate governance in India. We will see how the alleged fraud at Sino Forest and several other Chinese companies play out.

In Sino Forest’s case, independent investor-led research firm Muddy Waters has accused the company of “massively exaggerating its assets,” of having “a convoluted structure whereby it runs most of its revenues through ‘authorized intermediaries,’” and of having capital-raising tantamount to a “multi-billion dollar ponzi scheme,” with “substantial theft,” in the firm’s words.

These allegations, if proven, occurred on a Canadian stock exchange, tainting Canada’s reputation. Canadian director, Spencer Lanthier, at a celebratory dinner honoring Canadian directors, recently remarked publicly, “This city, this province, this country has a reputation of being the best location to carry out white collar crime, corporate fraud, in the industrialized world.”

Many Chinese and Indian companies have a small number of significant shareholders, typically company shareholders or management. In China’s case, “Guanxi” is prevalent, which means personalized networks of influence, or entrenched conflicts of interest and opaqueness, with law on the books but not enforced. The importance of an independent and effective board of directors cannot be overstated.

I have been asked for advice by corporate directors who have been approached to sit on boards of companies traded on North American stock exchanges with the majority of their activities or assets within India or China. Here is what I recommend, as a starting position for any director asked to serve on the board of such a company, all of which should be in writing and agreed to, prior to the director joining the board:

  1. The company must be audited by a licensed and properly qualified and staffed accounting firm that includes Anglo-American trained accountants who speak Mandarin (for Chinese companies). The accounting firm itself should be independently and annually assessed and have no adverse examinations. All quality assurance recommendations should be implemented by the accounting firm, including coordinated assurance cooperation by audit stakeholders such as vendors, banks, government entities, and other creditors, suppliers and customers.
  2. The company must comply with all corporate governance standards and there must be independent (e.g., Anglo-American) assurance of this compliance.
  3. The CFO and finance department of the company must be properly qualified and trained, have the necessary authority, and work at the headquarters of the company. The CFO must report directly to, and be assessed by, the Audit Committee.
  4. An internal audit function must exist, and this function must report directly to the Audit Committee at every meeting. The Audit Committee must approve the work-plan, qualifications, selection and compensation of the head of internal audit.
  5. The board of directors must have a majority of directors who are independent of management and the significant shareholder, if one exists. Half of the independent directors should have industry experience, including in China or India.
  6. Independent directors must have the authority to replace the CEO if necessary, even if resisted by the significant shareholder, particularly if the CEO is the significant shareholder.
  7. Independent directors should have authority to approve all related party transactions. Related parties should not vote and not be in the room when the transaction is discussed. The code of conduct should be written in Mandarin and all employees and key suppliers should sign off annually. Compliance should be independently assured and reported directly to the Audit Committee. Follow up directives from the Audit Committee must be implemented. The Audit Committee must have access to resources and advisors to fulfill its obligations. A proper whistle-blowing procedure should also exist, with external reporting to, and clarification provided by, an independent service provider.
  8. Director insurance and indemnification must be externally reviewed and adequate so the independent director is protected. Provisions to fund special committees and independent advisors should be provided, under the control of independent directors.
  9. Independent directors must have the authority to require external assurance for any material business risk and/or internal controls, including corruption risk.
  10. The chair of the board must be an independent director with leadership and industry experience sitting on listed Anglo-American company boards.
  11. The chair of the Audit Committee must be an independent financial expert with experience sitting on listed Anglo-American company audit committees.
  12. The Board must meet at least once a year in China (or India). Independent directors should meet with local management and personnel without senior management present. All recommendations must be acted upon and with a progress report provided to independent directors.

Boards of directors of companies traded on western stock exchanges must oversee effective internal controls over corruption, financial reporting and reputation risk.

The above points are a starting position and minimum thresholds to protect an independent director and afford necessary authority to fulfill his or her obligations.

 

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Canada’s Absence from the Global Movement Towards Diverse Boards of Directors

On Monday August 21st, I am delivering the opening keynote address to the annual Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries conference in Quebec City. (See my PDF slide deck with embedded links here). It is beneficial that the conference is being held in Quebec City this year. In Quebec, Premier Charest mandated into law in 2007 that by December 2011, boards of directors of all Quebec enterprises need to be comprised of an equal number of men and women, and that the cultural make-up of boards reflect more the ethnic diversity of Quebec.

Quebec City academic Marie-Soleil Tremblay was also a part of a working group of eight Canadians who addressed board diversity in a submission that was recently made to the European Commission, which is contemplating introducing initiatives to make boards of directors within European Union countries more diverse. (See the group’s report here and the European Union “Green Paper” on proposed corporate governance reforms here (PDF). The questions on board and gender diversity are 5 and 6.) I plan to draw on our group’s submission in my address. The diversification of Canadian boards will be my opening topic. I also plan to show this video provided to me by Catalyst in the US.

With the exception of the Province of Quebec, Canada has been noticeably absent from the global boardroom diversity movement. Major initiatives by market regulators – ranging from disclosure of diversity plans, to self-imposed objectives, to full-fledged board quotas – in the US, UK, Australia and a number of European countries are well underway. At a the 2011 Institute of Corporate Directors Fellowship Awards Gala, Spencer Lanthier, who was one of four Canadian directors honored, called boardroom diversity “the number one issue in corporate governance right now” and that boards should just “get on with it.”

It is difficult without some form of government leadership (e.g., disclosure of diversity plans in a “comply or explain” manner), similar to that of other countries, to expect corporate boards to “get on with it,” given that boards are of a limited size and bringing on a woman by necessity might require removing a man. Both women and men tell me in confidential interviews that the system is presently “stuck.” The figures in Canada for women on boards have hovered around 8-14%, depending on the survey, and have been stagnant for many years, with only small upticks. Australia recently reported, after the Australian Stock Exchange required companies to state diversity objectives and progress towards meeting them, a whopping 600% increase in women being appointed to corporate boards in just two years. Now women comprise 30% of all new director appointments. The figure used to be 7.5%.

There is no reason women should not comprise a similar percentage of all board appointments in Canada. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, which include scathing reports (here and here (PDF)) documenting governance and regulatory breakdowns, governments want to make sure that boards can be as strong as they possibly can be. There is academic evidence that women make better monitors within boardrooms and that men even enhance their performance when women come on to boards. (See my article in English, here, and in French, here.) There is also a case to be made that group-think (which means groups agreeing too much by virtue of similar background and social pressure to conform) is counteracted with greater diversity, in all forms (women, visible minorities, Aboriginal Peoples and people with disabilities). Beyond the academic case however, the business case is that having diverse boards ensures access to a broader talent pool of Canadian directors, as Canada increasingly sees China, India and Brazil as trader partners and our companies need to compete in the global marketplace.

The case against gender diverse boards is that many or most women are not former CEOs and do not have broad-based, business experience, with direct responsibility for profit and loss, which is helpful experience for boards. Yet there is scant academic evidence that CEOs make better directors. Moreover, enterprise leadership includes not-for-profit, professional firms, and divisional leadership within companies, as well as “up-and-comers” in the executive suites, such as CFOs and COOs. Competency matrixes (required for boards under National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines, section 3.12) now include skills such as social media/technology, sustainability, human resources, and public policy, where women are particularly strong. Expatriates with international experience (in India and Asia) who know the players and the markets are of enormous assistance to management teams when they sit on boards.

It is also not the case that diverse directors cannot be found, or the pool is too small, which is another argument against diverse boards. My LinkedIn® Group, Board Advisors, for example, includes 460 members. My profile alone has over 800 connections that include practicing directors and prospective directors at the top of their game. I am interviewing over 100 directors for my research and half of them I expect will be female and many will be visible minorities. There is a rich network of very well qualified directors out there for board positions. Search firms and nominating committees of boards would be well advised to look harder, and more creatively. The world has changed and prospective directors cannot simply be found at private clubs like they used to. Canada has incredibly talented directors, and we need to use all the available talent we can.

The benefits for board diversity are enormous. Boards need to get on with it, yes, but so do our government and regulatory leaders in providing that extra “nudge.” Having companies disclosure diversity plans, for the board, senior management and the company as a whole, is a needed first step.

 

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CEO Succession Planning – The Number One Job of the Board, But Poorly Done

I received a call from a board chair the other day. He wanted to see pay arrangements for his company’s C-suite executives to confirm that potential CEO successors heading business units were properly compensated. He felt entitled to this information but wanted to check with me first.

I said that the board should see any compensation of any individual within the company, as the board deems appropriate, to ensure that individuals are not taking inappropriate risks, based on new regulations (PDF, at page 8093). I have written about implementing risk-adjusted compensation.

That the board had not seen, much less approved, the pay and leadership development of potential CEO successors is a risk. TSX boards are responsible for succession planning under the regulations. If potential CEO successors are not compensated properly, they may be retention risks. Leadership development blockages may exist, but the board has no way of knowing this without a viable plan.

CEO succession planning is poorly carried out in many boards because CEOs drag their feet and ineffective boards accept this. The choice of CEO is the most important decision a board makes. Leadership can make or break an organization.

The reasons for poor CEO succession planning are simple. The current CEO is conflicted and so is the board. CEOs are conflicted because they are planning to replace themselves, which no one wants to do. Boards are conflicted because they are assessing their own work, namely their decision to hire the CEO in the first place.

Problems and solutions for poor CEO succession planning

Here are some of the telltale problems, solutions and red flags for poor CEO succession planning:

Problem: Dominant CEOs refuse to plan or unduly influence the process

Solution:

The board should own CEO succession planning, not the CEO. The current CEO’s views are important but should not over-ride. If a CEO is not being helpful, CEO succession planning should form part of incentive compensation, with specific objectives. CEO succession planning should start the day the new CEO is hired.

Red flags:

  • Chair and CEO roles held by the same person (see my recent paper on separate chairs);
  • a CEO who is a founder;
  • large pay gaps between the CEO and direct reports;
  • limited board exposure to high potential talent;
  • limited management bench strength; and
  • other signs of CEO entrenchment.

Problem: Boards of directors do not make CEO succession planning a priority

Solution:

The board should have a private session without the CEO to discuss and assign the leadership and scope of CEO succession planning. A robust CEO and leadership development plan from management should be requested. A board committee of independent directors should oversee the identification of executives matched to paths and time-frames, and make recommendations to the board.

Red flags:

  • A board that is not independent;
  • low director turnover;
  • minimal external benchmarking; and
  • lack of knowledge and information.

Problem: CEO succession planning relies on informality rather than concrete plans

Solution:

The next CEO profile and development leadership ladders for near, mid and long-term high potential talent, both internal and external, should be documented. Boards should understand the availability, quality, action plans, and special compensation arrangements for candidates. The board should provide input on, approve, and regularly discuss the CEO succession plan.

Red flags:

  • Plans are seen as personal rather than good governance;
  • limited resources and advisors for the board;
  • limited proxy disclosure of CEO succession planning; and
  • lack of even immediate successors.

No one is irreplaceable or will live forever

Directors often tell me when I ask about their biggest mistake that they waited too long to replace a CEO. Poor succession planning can adversely affect the morale and performance of any organization.

Organizations change and strategies change. Generally, people don’t, so the skills of a CEO and even directors may be outdated or not suited for the organization as it evolves.

CEO tenures have gotten much shorter.

You can’t replace someone without a viable alternative.  It becomes a lot easier for a board to “pull the trigger” when proper succession planning is done.  If there is dissatisfaction with CEO succession planning, that is the fault of the board.

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