Future Students, Alumni & Visitors


This blog is intended to be a governance resource and source of current governance commentary, offered by a corporate governance academic engaged in research, teaching and other ongoing academic activities. There is a very public element to the governance field, and it is hoped that this blog will contribute to the public discussion of current governance issues. It is also hoped that it will address a need in the governance field by presenting a holistic online approach to the topic. There is a rapid rate of change in the field of governance (public, private, government and not-for-profit entities) and developments in internet technology move swiftly. This governance blog offers resources for a broad variety of stakeholders including: [...more]




Six Corporate Governance Lessons for Boards of Directors from News Corp and Rupert Murdoch

I remember one of the first times I observed a control block board in action.  I was seated in the corner of a large room, with a yellow note pad.  Very esteemed directors were at the boardtable.  After a short period of time, in walked the Chairman and CEO, who was also a significant shareholder.  The person sat down, at the head of the table, and said that “these are my plans,” or words to this effect.  The Chair and CEO spoke for about ten minutes, after which the gavel was struck and directors were asked if there were any questions.  There weren’t more than one or two brief questions.  Then the board meeting ended and everyone went for lunch.  The entire meeting lasted about 20 minutes.

What this meeting taught me was how much power a Chair and CEO has, and especially if the person is a significant shareholder (e.g., Rupert Murdoch).  Directors are really not independent in these situations, directors tell me, but more of “friends” or “advisors” to the significant shareholder.  They owe their position on the board to this person.

The Perfect Corporate Governance Storm

When the significant shareholder also runs the company (CEO), and the board (Chair), the power differential is even more pronounced.  It is a corporate governance “trifecta” or “perfect storm.”

There are other criticisms being leveled at News Corp’s corporate governance practices.

Here are some of them and their application to Canadian boards.

1. Age and Tenure of Directors – Get on, Step up and Get off

Mr. Murdoch is 80 years old.  Fellow 79 year-old director Mr. Perkins worries about his “friend,” given that they are about the same age.  The board has eight other long-serving directors.

Directors can’t serve forever.  As one director put it to me yesterday, “Most people know when a director is not performing.”  From management’s perspective, nothing new is coming from the person and it has all been heard before.  Directors however “wiggle,” entrenching themselves as they obtain enormous reputational profile from sitting on prestigious boards.  The Chair of a CEO search committee told me yesterday that long-serving directors is one of the biggest problems on his board.

The UK Code (at B.1.1) has a presumption of losing director independence after nine years service.  (Canada has no comparable provision.)

In Canadian banks, for example, who largely set best practice examples for corporate governance, 30 directors among the top five banks have served beyond nine years.  Several directors have served on bank boards between 10 and 20 years, and in one case, a director has served for 25 years.

RBC has nine; Scotiabank has eight; BMO has seven; and TD has six directors serving beyond nine years.

Long-serving directors (banks and non banks) have served during loses (financial and non-financial).

Retirement ages and tenure limits exist to provide independence, fresh perspectives, and board diversity opportunities.  Diversity was recently described by an award-winning Canadian director as being the number one issue in Canadian corporate governance.

2. Tone at the Top, Access & Reporting

The News Corp board is criticized for not having properly investigated alleged phone-hacking, starting in 2007 when management was aware of the allegations (James Murdoch is alleged to have lied in this respect).  A special committee of independent directors certainly should be established now.  The committee established recently is still a management committee.  News Corp’s directorsaudit committee and external auditors have been criticized.

A board should have all material risks and internal controls reported on and assured, including reputation and code of conduct compliance.

A board or committee is entitled to access to any piece of information, advice or personnel to fulfill their responsibilities.

Good audit committees meet separately with the CFO, and Internal Audit.  Good boards will insist the CEO leave the room for a portion of every meeting, sometimes twice.

Good directors ask questions, even stupid questions.  If something is too good to be true, it likely is.  The question that should have been asked in the Murdoch boardroom is “How in the heck did we get this story??”

3. Independent Directors – In Substance as Well as Form

Formal independence guidelines, at least as currently drafted, do not ensure actual independence of mind of directors within a boardroom.

A majority of directors of a board should be reasonably perceived to be independent, not only of management, but also of any significant shareholder; and free from any association or relationship that could reasonably be perceived to compromise this independence.

The basis upon this independence should be affirmatively made, for each director, and readily accessible to shareholders and other stakeholders.

4. Significant Shareholder ~ “It’s [X]’s way or the highway”

If a corporation has a significant shareholder, an appropriate percentage of board seats should be reserved for minority shareholder representation, and that percentage should fairly reflect the investment in the corporation by shareholders other than the significant shareholder.

The only way to represent minority shareholders is a seat at the table.  Independent directors are too beholden to the significant shareholder.

In the News Corp board, the case could be made that 60% of the directors are independent from Mr. Murdoch (the Murdoch family owns 12% of the company and 40% of the voting shares), but because of formal independence guidelines, and because Mr. Murdoch is also Chair, the balance it tiled in favor of Mr. Murdoch.

5. Board Leadership – Independent and Effective

It is a governance red flag to have the CEO and Chair and significant shareholder be the same person, as is the case at News Corp.

A board chair should be independent (see above).

The duties and responsibilities of both the Chair and the CEO should be clear, detailed, and accessible to stakeholders.  The Chair and CEO should be separately assessed on their duties by all directors.  Remediation and feedback should be provided, including replacement as necessary.  Succession planning for both positions should be publicly available.

If the mandate of the board is limited in any way by a significant shareholder, this should be disclosed.

6. Related Party Transactions

Lastly, the News Corp board is being sued by shareholders for a transaction with Mr. Murdoch’s daughter.  This is a related party transaction.

A related party transaction is a conflict of interest between the related party (e.g., a control person, a significant shareholder, an officer, or a director of the corporation) and the corporation itself.

A related party transaction is essentially a deal between an insider and the company.  Therefore non-insiders should approve it.

If the board of directors does not take all appropriate action or shareholders (all shareholders, including minority) do not have full and complete knowledge of, or the opportunity to approve the transaction, the result could be self-dealing and appropriation of monies or opportunities by the related party at the expense of the corporation and/or minority shareholders.

At a minimum, a special committee composed of directors independent from all related parties should be established, with independent expert opinion retained on the effect of the transaction on the company and minority shareholders.

We will see how the News Corp scandal plays out, but it is widespread and there are lessons to be learned on governance best practices.

 

Save and Share
  • Print
  • PDF
  • email
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
  • Reddit
  • del.icio.us
  • StumbleUpon
  • Add to favorites
  • RSS

Ken Feinberg on Independence of Compensation Consultants

Former Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Kenneth Feinberg gave a key note address to a full room of 112 corporate governance academics from 27 countries being held at The Wharton School yesterday.

Mr Feinberg said he “remained dubious” of the argument that not paying executives what they believe they are worth risks that they will leave “to Europe or China.” 85% of the 175 people whose compensation fell under Mr Feinberg’s jurisdiction still are with the 7 companies that were under his purview, and he had not checked why the 15% had left.

In a humorous moment, he indicated the need to “get his own data” and finding an “independent compensation consultant,” at which point he deadpanned “There are none! So I went to the next best thing ~ academia.”

In a Q and A session to follow, in response to his view on the causes to the global financial crisis, Mr Feinberg remarked that “I do think, in a Washington / lay opinion, from someone who was a former chief of staff to Senator Kennedy, that the financial crisis had more to do with external absence of governmental regulation… The Reagan revolution went too far,” he said.

Save and Share
  • Print
  • PDF
  • email
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
  • Reddit
  • del.icio.us
  • StumbleUpon
  • Add to favorites
  • RSS

Risk Oversight by the Board ~ To What Extent?

A bus driver veers off course and travels under a bridge killing and injuring several people.  A natural gas pipeline containing numerous welds of smaller segments explodes in a residential neighborhood, destroying several dozen homes.  A food company sells bacteria-infected meat, killing several people.  An oil company’s deep water rig explodes, causing catastrophic environmental damage.

Internal controls over reporting of non-financial operational risks in moving from gross to residual risk — such as automated GPS dispatch monitored systems, safety checks for compliance, pipe construction and fatigue, segmentation of duties and oversight for cleaning food processing machines, and tests to detect hydrocarbons running up a well, all exist.

In management’s reporting of risk and the design and effectiveness of internal controls to a board, can or should a board be able to understand and identify key risks, and if necessary – in its or a committee’s discretion, particularly when it is aware or should be aware of material and anomalous safety infractions for example – require independent (internal or external) assurance over that risk?  It is not the case that a CEO is not disconnected from – or should not be held responsible for – treatment of risks lower down in an organization, for a CEO holds levers of power and signals to the entire organization how risk (including the treatment of internal controls) is treated, by how similar risks are and have been treated.  A CEO sets the culture as directed by the board.  It is not the case that a board – or even a single director – cannot have significant influence over the CEO – in understanding and directing that CEO and other direct reports to comply with best risk oversight practices.  Indeed one director or chair with leadership skills, industry knowledge and independence, can direct the turn around of the entire risk management system in a large complex organization, simply by relentlessly pressing management and building consensus with the board that the tone at the top is to be properly established.  The author has seen this happen.

This question of the role of the board in risk means that a board needs to understand fully the business model of the company and its material risks.  It means that directors should be recruited with a view to understanding risk.  (For example, a director of an airline could be recruited with military experience who would understand internal controls over labeling (and poisoning) the pilot’s food.  A director of a bank could be recruited with 25 years of risk management experience.)  In addition, a director or committee overseeing risk (particularly non-financial for non-financial companies) should be empowered to seek outside assurance that management’s attestations are accurate – as a constant check on management.  The Walker report in the UK came very close to giving risk committees of financial institutions this responsibility and power.  King III in South Africa recommends that the audit committee of a board obtain “combined” assurance (which means management, internal and external assurance), and that sustainability risks (defined broadly to be non-financial) be “independently” assured.  In addition, financial and sustainability reporting is to be “integrated”.  This would mean that non-financial risks have parity in treatment and reporting with financial risks.  One non-executive chair of a large American food company interviewed last week agreed with this parity of non-financial risks and indicated the most significant improvement to risk oversight by the board, other than the appointment of a non-executive chair, was to remove the oversight of non-financial risk from the purview of the audit committee and lodge it with the governance committee.

Save and Share
  • Print
  • PDF
  • email
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
  • Reddit
  • del.icio.us
  • StumbleUpon
  • Add to favorites
  • RSS

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ~ Significant Corporate Governance and Financial Services Changes Forthcoming

On July 15th, after passing the US House of Representatives, the US Senate passed, by a vote of 60 to 39, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  The Act was signed into law by President Obama on July 21st.  This legislation (over 2,300 pages) is the most significant omnibus financial services and corporate governance legislation since the Great Depression.  Mary Schapiro, the Chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), called it a “giant step.”  Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, said the bill “must be supported by more effective and disciplined regulation and supervision.”  The President remarked, “For years, our financial sector was governed by antiquated and poorly enforced rules that allowed some to game the system and take risks that endangered the entire economy.”

Here are some of the most significant highlights of the Act:[1]

  • “Say-on-pay” – Shareholders will have a right to a non-binding vote on executive pay and “golden parachutes” arising from mergers and acquisitions.
  • Proxy access – The Act affirms the authority of the SEC to create rules over proxy access (these are forthcoming).
  • Board leadership – Companies must disclose and explain whether the board chair is independent and separate from the CEO, as well as the structure of their board leadership.

 

  • Women and minorities – The Act creates an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion at each of the federal banking and securities regulatory agencies, to coordinate assistance, address diversity matters and seek diversity in the workforce of regulators.

 

  • Clawbacks – Companies must recover executive incentive pay derived from incorrect financial statements.
  • Compensation committees and compensation disclosure – Compensation committees must have fully independent members and advisors.  Committees must disclose the relationship between past compensation and company performance, and the ratio between the median annual compensation of all employees of a company, excluding the CEO, and the annual compensation of the CEO.
  • Oversight of compensation in the financial services industry – The Act requires full disclosure of incentive compensation.  Regulators can prohibit any incentives deemed excessive or that could lead to significant financial losses.

 

  • Hedging – There is to be full disclosure of directors’ or employees’ use of instruments to hedge against decreases in the value of the company’s shares.
  • Broker voting – Beneficial owners must consent for a broker to vote shares on their behalf.

 

  • Consumer protection – The Act provides for the creation of an independent Consumer Protection Financial Bureau with clearly defined oversight powers to develop rules and enforce them, to educate the public and, more generally, act in the interests of consumers.
  • Investor protection – The Act also provides for the creation of the Office of Investor Advocate and an Investment Advisory Committee for investor protection.  There is to be increased funding and resources provided to, and management reform of, the SEC, the creation of a SEC program whereby whistleblowers are incented financially to come forward (with the promise of 30 percent of funds recovered), and SEC authority to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who give investment advice.
  • Derivatives trading – There is to be central clearance and exchange trading for derivatives that can be cleared, a code of conduct applied to swap dealers and participants, and enhanced market transparency and regulatory oversight for over-the-counter derivatives.
  • Systemic risks – The Act provides for the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council with expert membership and technical expertise.  There are strict rules for leverage, capital standards, liquidity and risk management.  Non-bank financial companies will come under regulation.  Finally, there will be the power to require large, complex companies to divest some of their holdings, subject to risk assessment.
  • Too big to fail – “Funeral plans” are to be submitted by large, complex financial companies to the Orderly Liquidation Authority and other regulators, and to the Treasury Secretary, who ultimately will determine whether the “failure of the financial company would threaten US financial stability.”  Orderly liquidation mechanisms (with judicial review) will provide for shareholders and creditors to bear losses and management and culpable directors to be removed.
  • Reform of the Federal Reserve – The Act provides for enhanced audit, transparency, governance and supervisory accountability of the Federal Reserve, the election of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents by elected and appointed directors who represent the public (not by members elected to represent member banks), and limits on emergency lending and debt guarantees to an individual entity.
  • Mortgage reform – Lenders are to ensure the ability of borrowers to repay.  Penalties are to be imposed for irresponsible lending.  Consumer disclosure is to be strengthened and consumers are to be protected from high cost mortgages.
  • Hedge funds – There is to be registration with, and trading portfolio disclosure to, the SEC and greater state supervision of hedge funds.
  • Credit rating agencies – The Act creates an Office of Credit Ratings at the SEC and requires the examination of “Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations.”  These organizations are to have independent boards, disclose methodologies and track records, consider independent credible information, pass qualifying exams for personnel, institute continuing education, and address and disclose conflicts of interest.  The SEC is to create a new mechanism to prevent issuers of asset backed-securities from picking the agency that provides the highest rating.  Regulatory requirements for externally-sourced ratings are to be reduced and investors are to be encouraged to conduct their own analyses.  Investors are to have private rights of action against rating agencies.
  • Volcker rule – Proprietary trading by banks and investment in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds are to be prohibited, with small exceptions.
  • Credit card fees and scores – The Federal Reserve is to issue rules to ensure fees are reasonable and proportional.  Consumers are to have free access to their credit score as part of an adverse decision or action taken that is detrimental to the consumer.
  • Securitization – Companies selling mortgage-backed securities are to retain at least five percent of the credit risk and disclosure of the underlying asset quality is to occur.
  • Extraction Industry – The Act requires public disclosure of payments made to US and foreign governments relating to commercial development of oil, natural gas and minerals.

The above legislative changes are significant and far-reaching, affecting investors, consumers, credit rating agencies and financial services companies.  Several new and powerful regulatory offices are created, with recommendation and rule-making abilities yet to come.  The Act marks an end to regulatory deference to the financial services sector and signals a firm regulatory hand in this vital sector in the US.  There is no doubt that corporate governance practices in US financial services firms will need to adapt quickly to the new landscape.  Boards of non-financial firms should take note too as changes in this sector could signal further legislative and regulatory changes more broadly.


[1] Majority voting, interestingly, was not included in the legislation. Anne Simpson, head of corporate governance at Calpers, calls the lack of majority voting, coupled with proxy rules applied only to uncontested elections, a “big hole” in the Act. The Financial Times reports, “without majority voting [in the Act] to allow shareholders to remove incumbent directors, proxy access is next to worthless.”  See “Investing: Rules of Engagement” The Financial Times (July 11, 2010).

Save and Share
  • Print
  • PDF
  • email
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
  • Reddit
  • del.icio.us
  • StumbleUpon
  • Add to favorites
  • RSS